Borrowing from the concept of keystone species in ecological food webs, a recent focus in 25 the field of animal behaviour has been keystone individuals: individuals whose impact on 26 population dynamics is disproportionally larger than their frequency in the population. In 27 populations evolving culture, such may be the role of high-magnitude innovators: 28 individuals whose innovations are a major departure from the population's existing 29 behavioural repertoire. Their effect on cultural evolution is twofold: they produce 30 innovations that constitute a 'cultural leap', and, once copied, their innovations may induce 31 further innovations by conspecifics (socially induced innovations), as they explore the new 32 behaviour themselves. I use computer simulations to study the co-evolution of independent 33 innovations, socially induced innovations, and innovation magnitude, and show that while 34 socially induced innovation is assumed here to be less costly than independent innovation, 35 it does not readily evolve. When it evolves, it may in some conditions select against 36 independent innovation and lower its frequency, despite it requiring independent 37 innovation in order to operate; at the same time, however, it leads to much faster cultural 38 evolution. These results confirm the role of high-magnitude innovators as keystones, and 39 suggest a novel explanation for low frequency of independent innovation. 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 Introduction 47
may shape the evolution of culture [21] [22] [23] . The different nature that innovations may have 71 pertains to a longstanding dispute in the animal behaviour literature. While it is intuitively 72 clear that not all innovations are similar in their inception and impact, how can we define 73 the differences between them in general terms? 74 75
In a recent paper, we approached this issue by describing behavioural innovations as 76 measured by their magnitude [24] . Relying on a previous definition [25] , we suggested that 77 any new behaviour, no matter how similar to behaviours already in the populations' 78 behavioural repertoire, should be considered an innovation; however, we argued that these 79 innovations may differ in how close to or far from the population's mean behaviour they 80 are. Innovations that are far from the mean are considered high-magnitude innovations, 81 while innovations that are close to the mean are considered of low-magnitude (see detailed 82 discussion in [24] ). Offering a great increase in the population's fitness, high-magnitude 83 innovations that spread in the population may therefore be viewed as a cultural 'leap' [21] . 84 85 High-magnitude innovations, by definition, differ significantly from familiar behaviours. 86
They may include the introduction of a new object to interact with [26], a new territory to 87 forage in [27], a new feeding method to utilize [28] , or a new song to replicate [29] . 88
Viewing others interact with an unfamiliar object may allow neophobic individuals to 89 overcome their fear, or simply draw attention to an object that copiers have not noticed 90 before [30, 31] . Thus, high-magnitude innovations allow copiers of the innovation to 91 explore a new domain and perhaps modify it by innovating themselves. Models focusing on 92 the effect of different innovation types on human cultural evolution have utilized the latter 93
idea, suggesting to account for the punctuated evolutionary pattern found in the human 94 artifact archeological record [21] [22] [23] . High-magnitude innovators may therefore not only 95 serve as keystone individuals by generating cultural leaps, but also by facilitating socially 96 induced innovations, that further modify their own. 97
98
In this study, I expand upon our previous work on the magnitude of innovation in social 99 animals [24], to include cultural evolution. I investigate whether a trait allowing socially 100 induced innovation can evolve, examine the effect of such a trait on the evolution of 101 independent innovation and on the magnitude of innovation, and finally, analyze how all 102 these traits interact to shape the progression of culture. 103 6 manner. After the T steps of the learning phase, individuals applied the behaviours they 116 have acquired, with greater weight given to higher-paying behaviours. Individuals then 117 produced offspring in proportion to the relative payoff they have accumulated during their 118 lifetime, and died. The mean of the highest paying behaviours learned by parents was 119 defined as their generation's cultural contribution, and considered the new generation's 120 behavioural baseline for cultural evolution calculations. 121
122
The population 123 A population of n = 100 individuals is modeled, with each individual characterized by three 124 focal genes: L (Learning gene), I (Innovation magnitude gene), and C (socially induced 125 innovation gene). The learning gene, L, determined the probability the individual will, at 126 each learning step, produce an independent innovation, or copy a conspecific's innovation. square root of the individual's probability to innovate as set by its L allele, i.e. an increase in 140 innovation probability that is proportional to genetic tendency for independent innovation; 141 and C1 -for a probability of 1, i.e. the individual is certain to innovate. Just like independent 142 innovation, the magnitude of an individual's socially induced innovation was determined 143 by its genotype in the I gene. 144 145
Learning phase 146
All individuals in the population had a limited number of learning steps T = 10. In each of 147 these steps they acquired one new behaviour, either by innovation or by copying an 148 innovation a conspecific has produced at that specific step (our previous model analyzing 149 the case of T = 100 found no significant differences between the two case, see Arbilly and 150 Laland 2017). At the beginning of each step, it was determined for each individual whether 151 it would innovate or copy, based on the probability dictated by its L genotype. Individuals 152 who were to innovate generated a new behaviour. The value of this innovative behaviour 153 (i.e. its payoff) was drawn from a normal distribution whose mean was the population's 154 mean behaviour, and whose standard deviation was the innovator's allele in the I gene; for 155 convenience, the population's mean behaviour value was set to 0. Then, individuals who 156 were to copy in this learning step, copied the behaviours generated by innovators. All 157 innovations were ranked according to their value, and which innovations would be copied 158 depended on the selectivity of social learning in the population (which was kept constant 159 per population). The selectivity of social learning was controlled using the variable D, 160 defined as 1 -[the fraction of demonstrators copied]. When selectivity was high (high D)
only innovations with the highest value were copied (e.g. when D = 0.9 only the top 10% of 162 innovation were copied); as the selectivity of social learning became lower, copying 163 became more random (and was completely random at D = 0). 164
165
In cases where individuals copied a high-magnitude innovation, defined as an innovation 166 whose value was greater than 1 (putting it at a distance greater than one standard 167 deviation from the population's mean behaviour), it was determined whether they will 168 modify this innovation in the following learning step, t+1, based on their socially induced 169 innovation (C) allele. If they were to innovate, the magnitude of their innovation was set by 170 their I allele. These individuals produced an innovation at the beginning of step t+1 along 171 with independent innovators (described above). However, for these socially induced 172 innovators, the value of their innovation was added to the value of the high-magnitude who, in step t+1, are copying others, as described above. The choice to have socially 176 induced innovation triggered only by the copying of high-magnitude innovations, rather 177 than the copying of any innovation, was made in order to set these innovations apart from 178 independent innovations (see Discussion). 179 180
Application phase 181
After acquiring the behaviours, individuals apply these behaviours and will tend to use 182 them with a frequency directly proportional to the payoff they offer. To calculate the 183 proportion of time allotted to each behaviour, and since payoffs can be negative as well as positive, an exponential transformation of the form: 185
(1) 186 is used, where px is the proportion of time spent using behaviour x, βx is the payoff of 187 behaviour x, i = 1 … j are the behaviours the individual has acquired during its learning 188 phase (j = T), and σ is the application sensitivity: the degree to which agents can distinguish 189 between payoffs in choosing which behaviours to apply. This value is the same for all 190 agents. Following previous analysis [24] , σ was set to its high value (σ = 3.3), such that 191 agents spend a higher proportion of their time applying the highest paying behaviour and 192 little to no time applying low value behaviours. Note that due to the stochastic process used 193 in the simulation to generate new behaviours, then unless there is no innovation in the 194 population, behaviours 1 … j will each be unique. 
Selection and reproduction 202
To calculate the total payoff to individuals in the population, WT, the payoff obtained both 203 during the learning phase, WL (which is the sum of all payoffs of behaviours learned), and 204
during the application phase, WA, was summed using a weight factor α = 0.1 to account for 205 the relative time allocated to the learning phase compared to the application phase: 206 .
(3)
207
Payoff received for behaviours was included in the learning phase payoff calculation (in the 208 form of WL) regardless of whether they were applied, as it is assumed that agents perform 209 behaviours when they are learning them, in order to experience their exact payoff. arbitrary, the actual value of this mean does not matter for purposes of innovation in the 231 next generation, and furthermore, using it as the mean for the distribution from which the 232 next generation draws innovations inflates cultural evolution rates, this cultural 233 contribution was set aside and the actual mean used to draw innovations was zero for all 234 generations. These cultural contributions were then used cumulatively to calculate the 235 progress of cultural evolution. For example, if generation 1's contribution was 1.5, and 236 generation 2's contribution was 0.5, the final value of culture for generation 2 was 237 1.5+0.5=2, and so on for following generations. The choice to use the mean of parents' 238 highest paying behaviours is conservative: using only the single highest paying behaviour 239 for each generation would have resulted in higher cultural rates. 240
241

RESULTS 242
Evolution of socially induced innovation 243
The allele frequency in socially induced innovation gene, C, changed with social learning 244 selectivity, D (figure 1). The C1 allele, setting the probability of socially induced innovation 245 to 1, had a clear advantage when the selectivity of social learning was low (D ≤ 0.1). The much lower frequency, with some advantage over C0 (allele coding for no effect); this 248 advantage of Csqrt over C0 disappeared when D = 0.1. When selectivity was higher, C1 was 249 found at low frequencies, while Csqrt and C0 appeared at similar frequencies (between 40% 250 and 50% each). It should be noted that in that range of social learning selectivity D, 251 independent innovation rate, set by the L gene, was close to zero (figure 2a): in most 252 generations individuals had an independent innovation rate of zero, therefore the Csqrt 253 allele would have no effect on them, similar to C0. 254 255
Rate of independent innovation in the presence of socially induced innovation 256
A comparison of the genetic probability of independent innovation rate in the presence and 257 in the absence of the C gene shows an effect changing with the selectivity of social learning, 258 D (figure 2a). While in the absence of C the genetic probability represents the expected 259 probability of innovation in the population, in the presence of C, the actual rate of 260 independent innovation may be lower than the genetic probability, as individuals may use 261 some of their learning steps for socially induced innovation, instead of drawing between 262 innovation and social learning based on their L allele. When the selectivity of social 263 learning was at its lowest -where copying is completely random -socially induced 264 innovation significantly decreased the rate of independent innovation. When social 265 learning selectivity was poor while still eliminating the worst innovations (D = 0.1), the 266 rate of independent innovation was the same with and without C. When selectivity was 267 higher but still in the low range (0.2 ≤ D ≤ 0.5), the rate of independent innovation was 268 slightly higher in the presence of the C gene. As the effect is very small, and due to the 269 complicated frequency-dependent interaction between the three genes, it is difficult to determine whether this is due to noise created by drift in the C gene, because socially 271 induced innovations increase the benefit of independent innovation by increasing the 272 competition, because carriers of the Csqrt allele benefit when also carrying an L allele with a 273 value that is higher than zero, or some combination of these. However, more selective 274 social learning resulted in similar, close to zero rates of independent innovation, with and 275 without socially induced innovation. 276
277
Magnitude of innovation in the presence of socially induced innovation 278
When the selectivity of social learning was at its lowest -where copying was completely 279 random -the magnitude of innovation was lower in the presence of socially induced 280 innovation, although still very high (0.91 compared to 0.99; figure 2b ). In the medium 281 range of social learning selectivity, however, the magnitude of innovation was consistently 282 higher in the presence of socially induced innovation, and as in the absence of socially 283 induced innovation, decreased as selectivity in social learning increased. Socially induced innovations would seem to have a clear advantage: building on a known 295 high-magnitude innovation, they offer the possibility of generating an even better 296 innovation, with a lower risk compared to independent innovation. That is, even if the 297 socially induced innovation resulted in a lower value behaviour compared to the 298 independent innovation it was building upon, it is still less likely to be below the 299 population's mean value of behaviour, unlike independent innovations. Still, socially 300 induced innovations do not evolve when the selectivity of social learning is high: in that 301 situation, others are likely to copy a high-magnitude socially induced innovation, without 302 incurring the possible cost of producing a low-magnitude innovation. The cost for the 303 socially induced innovator here is not only in having a lower value behaviour in its 304
repertoire, but also in missing the chance of copying a better behaviour produced by 305 someone else at that time step. This opportunity cost stems from the assumptions of the 306 model, whereby individuals must perform the behaviour in order to learn it, know its exact 307 payoff, and be "inspired" to modify it further with their own innovation. 308 309 Most significant is the effect of socially induced innovation on the rate of independent 310 innovation when copying was random (D = 0). In that condition, in the absence of the C 311 gene, the rate of independent innovation is up to 0.64±0.02, but when incorporating the C 312 gene, the rate was down to 0.13±0.01. The magnitude of innovation was also somewhat 313 lower. The dominating allele in the C gene at that time was C1, guaranteeing a socially 314 induced innovation whenever a high-magnitude innovation was copied. This combination 315 of traits is, perhaps unsurprisingly, "safer" than a high rate of independent innovation when social learning selectivity is low, the selectivity in application of behaviour is high, 318
thus individuals do not blindly utilize behaviours; they are simply unable to judge the value 319 of a behaviour without performing it first themselves. Regardless of the specific condition, 320 it demonstrates how socially induced innovation may affect independent innovation, in a 321 situation where independent innovation would otherwise be highly favoured. While 322 lowering the rate of independent innovation, and the magnitude of all innovations, the C 323 gene also lead here to a much higher rate of cultural evolution: socially induced innovations 324 may be copied by others, who may subsequently use them as a basis for further socially-325 induced innovations, resulting in a cascade of innovations. Altogether, socially induced 326 innovation, which can only act in the presence of high-magnitude independent innovation, 327 selects here against high-magnitude independent innovators, and by lowering their 328 frequency makes their role, as initiators of the innovation cascade, more crucial. In other 329 words, it makes them keystone individuals. 330
331
The definition of keystone individuals, as discussed by Modlmeier et al [4] , asserts that 332 keystones cannot be "generic": if removed, their niche cannot simply be filled by others. In 333 the model presented here, individuals may be genetically identical, but few may, by chance, 334 produce a high-magnitude independent innovation, while others may copy it and modify it. 335
Their role as keystones is determined based on the result of their actions. Their 336 independent innovations are a product of probability, and within a generation lifetime do 337 not depend on whether others may have or may not have produced high-magnitude 338 independent innovations of their own. Thus, the removal of a specific keystone individual would indeed not result in another individual in the population producing a high-340 magnitude innovation in its place. 341
342
The results of the model provide, through proof of concept, insight into the co-evolution of 343 independent and socially induced innovation. As human technology is undoubtedly made 344 of cascades of innovations [32], the finding that socially induced innovations may select 345 against independent innovation is highly relevant, and fits nicely with results of models 346 that combine these two types of innovations, to demonstrate how human culture may have 347 evolved in "bursts", composed of initial 'lucky leap' innovations that are followed by further 348 
